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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit explicitly abolished the long-standing doctrine of inextricable
intertwinement as a basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence.1
Other bad acts evidence is usually inadmissible, as it tends to suggest
improper character inferences. 2 However, in some instances, this type
of evidence is intertwined with other admissible evidence in such a
way that it helps to complete the story of the crime by filling a
conceptual or chronological void 3 or is so blended or connected that it
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends
to prove an element of the charged crime. 4 In such circumstances, the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Notre Dame Law School; A.B., Philosophy, June
2007, Dartmouth College. Visiting student at Chicago-Kent College of Law during
the 2010–2011 academic year.
1
See United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010).
2
See infra notes 13–25.
3
See, e.g., United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2007).
4
See, e.g., United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ojomo, 332
D.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir.
2002).

196
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

1

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

doctrine of inextricable intertwinement is invoked to admit the
evidence. 5 This doctrine’s relationship with Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b)’s prohibition against the use of other bad acts evidence has
become increasingly confusing and problematic. The Seventh Circuit’s
recent decisions indicate an increasing frustration with the doctrine,
with the court believing that the doctrine has “become overused,
vague, and quite unhelpful” and as such, “has outlived its
usefulness.” 6 In United States v. Gorman, the Seventh Circuit
altogether abolished the doctrine in favor of the exclusive use of Rule
404(b) 7 as the basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence. 8 To
date, the Seventh Circuit is alone in this practice. However, it is the
position of this Comment that as a result of the way the doctrine has
been expanded since its creation, the doctrine should be abolished in
the other circuits as well. As currently applied, the doctrine poses
significant threats to defendants’ rights. 9
I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The term “character evidence” is used to indicate any evidence
“probative of a pertinent trait of a person’s character, such as honesty,
temperance or peacefulness.” 10 This evidence may be presented in
either civil or criminal trials, and may be introduced in three ways:
reputation testimony, personal opinion testimony, or by evidence of
specific acts previously committed by the defendant. 11 The most
persuasive of these proofs is evidence of prior acts, which can be
particularly damning in the context of prior crimes, wrongs, or
misconducts. 12 As such, the American legal system has created special
5

Id.
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.
7
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
8
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.
9
See infra notes 17–18, 229–43 and accompanying text.
10
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
11
CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 443 (2d ed. 1972); see also FED. R. EVID.
6

405.
12

MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 443.
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standards with which to determine the admissibility of this type of
evidence.
A. Other Bad Acts Evidence
Admissibility of prior acts evidence, especially in the context of
prior bad acts, poses substantial risks. Other bad acts evidence is often
highly prejudicial, tending to “distract the trier of fact from the main
question of what actually happened on the particular occasion . . . [and
subtly permitting] . . . the trier of fact to reward the good man and to
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what
the evidence in the case shows actually happened.” 13 The introduction
of other bad acts evidence may further prejudice the defendant by
creating an unfair risk of surprise, thereby robbing him or her of the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. 14 It “saddles a person with
disabilities because of prior conduct” 15 and “violates a social
commitment to the thesis that each person remains mentally free and
autonomous at every point in his [or her] life.” 16 The nature of the
evidence is problematic as well; the evidence is often of little
probative value, yet its introduction is unduly time-consuming. Its
admissibility may even be unconstitutional, implicating, in the context
of other criminal acts, the prohibition against double jeopardy 17 or the
right against self-incrimination. 18 Recognizing the severity of the risks
13

FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
See JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 54.1 (1983
& Supp. 1983).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5239 (1978 & Supp. 1993) (“When the defendant has previously been
acquitted of . . . uncharged crimes, their evidentiary use undermines the values that
support the prohibition on double jeopardy.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . .”).
18
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, at § 5239 (“The privilege against selfincrimination can be eroded where the defendant is forced to take the stand to
answer the uncharged offenses, thus emphasizing his failure to testify as to the
14
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and high likelihood of their occurrence, American courts exercise great
caution in admitting such evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 embodies the current American rule
regarding the admissibility of other bad acts evidence: “Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” 19
However, Rule 404(b) bans this evidence only when it is being used as
propensity evidence, i.e., to demonstrate an individual’s propensity to
act in a certain way based on his or her prior conduct. 20 The
prohibition against this use of character evidence “is so deeply
embedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional
proportions.” 21 However, Rule 404(b) provides an exception for
certain uses of a specific kind of character evidence; the evidence
“may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.” 22 Proponents must offer the evidence for
specific identified purposes, with the proponent only able to argue and
the trier of fact only able to consider the evidence as possible proof of
the elements for which it was offered. 23 Once a permissible, nonpropensity theory of relevance has been identified, the court cannot
exclude the evidence unless it finds that “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

charged offense.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
19
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
20
Id.
21
Fed. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note (1991).
22
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For a discussion on the effective limitations of this
clause, see infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.
23
See Jason M. Brauser, Comment, Intrinsic or Extrinsic?: The Confusing
Distinction Between Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Other Crimes Evidence
Under Rule 404(b), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1582, 1598 (1994) (“Congress intended the
court to specify the purposes for which it will use the evidence in order to foster
greater admissibility while still guarding against impermissible character uses.”).
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delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence” 24 under Rule 403. 25
B. Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine
The inextricable intertwinement doctrine is frequently invoked as
a basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence. This judiciallycreated doctrine allows bad acts evidence to be admitted when it is
intertwined with other admissible evidence in such a way that “it helps
to complete the story of the crime by filling a conceptual or
chronological void” 26 or “is so blended or connected that it
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends
to prove any element of, the charged crime.” 27 The doctrine is
premised on the fact that evidence inextricably intertwined with the
charged conduct is, by its very nature, not other bad acts and therefore,
does not implicate Rule 404(b). 28 As such, evidence admitted under
this doctrine is not subject to the same constraints as evidence under
Rule 404(b). 29

24

FED. R. EVID. 403.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) Senate Judiciary Committee’s note. (“It is anticipated
that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it
only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e., prejudice,
confusion or waste of time.”).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2007) .
27
See, e.g., United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ojomo, 332
D.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir.
2002).
28
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 5239, at 427, 445.
29
United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[E]vidence
admitted under this doctrine ‘lie[s] outside the purview of the Rule 404(b)
character/propensity prohibition,’ and is not subject to its constraints regarding the
manner in which the evidence may be used.”) (citations omitted); see also infra
notes 229–43 and accompanying text.
25
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1. Development
The inextricable intertwinement exception to the prohibition
against other bad acts evidence first emerged as the “inseparable
crimes exception.” 30 While the court in People v. Molineux 31 readily
acknowledged that “the exceptions to the rule [of the inadmissibility of
other bad acts evidence’s inadmissibility] cannot be stated with
categorical precision,” 32 the court clearly recognized an inextricable
intertwinement exception. 33 In that case, Ronald Molineux was
charged with murder in the first degree for his alleged involvement in
the death of Katharine Adams. 34 Molineux sent by mail a bottle
labeled “Bromo Seltzer” to Adams’s housemate, Harry Cornish;
however, instead of containing Bromo Seltzer, the bottle contained
cyanide of mercury, a type of poison. 35 Cornish innocently
administered the contents of the bottle to Adams while attempting to
treat a headache of hers, and thus, inadvertently caused her death. 36
During the course of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of
Molineux’s alleged involvement with the murder of Henry Barnet,
who had died seven weeks earlier. 37 Prior to his death, a bottle labeled
as “Kutnow powder” had been sent to Barnet through the mail. 38
When this bottle was tested after Barnet’s death, it was discovered that
rather than containing the indicated Kutnow powder, the bottle
actually contained cyanide of mercury. 39 This same type of poison had
also killed Barnet. 40 Molineux was not charged with Barnet’s death. 41
The prosecution presented evidence of Barnet’s death in an attempt to
30

Brauser, supra note 23, at 1594–95.
61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
32
Id. at 293.
33
Id. at 293, 299–302.
34
Id. at 287.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 287–88.
37
Id. at 289–90.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 290.
41
Id. at 286.
31
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prove Molineux’s guilt in murdering Adams. 42 Molineux appealed the
resulting conviction to the New York Court of Appeals. 43 The court of
appeals strongly emphasized the general rule prohibiting the use of
any other bad acts evidence. 44 The court did, however, recognize the
existence of a few exceptions to this rule and reasoned that other bad
acts evidence may be competent to prove, inter alia, “a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others.” 45
Although at first blush, it would appear that the court was
recognizing an exception only for other bad acts evidence that
demonstrated a common plan or scheme, the court’s further
development of the exception indicated that it also intended this
exception to encompass other bad acts evidence inextricably
intertwined with the charged crime. In elaborating upon the exception,
the court indicated that the exception is meant to encompass situations
in which “two or more crimes are committed by the same person in
pursuance of a single design, or under circumstances which render it
impossible to prove one without proving all.” 46 Though the court’s
discussion focused primarily upon the common scheme or plan prong
of the exception, it is clear that the notion of inextricably intertwined
evidence is separate and distinct. For this exception to apply, “there
must be evidence of [a] system between the offense on trial and the
one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as parts of a
general and composite plan or scheme, or they must be so related to
each other as to show a common motive or intent running through
both.” 47 The exception is extremely narrow, requiring a connection
between the crimes “to have existed both in fact and in the mind of the
actor.” 48 If a court is unable to “clearly perceive” the connection, the

42

Id. at 289.
Id. at 287.
44
Id. at 292–93.
45
Id. at 294.
46
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
47
Id. (emphasis added).
48
Id.
43
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dangers of admitting such evidence indicate that the “the accused
should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence rejected.” 49
Turning to the facts of the case, the Molineux court held that the
evidence of Barnet’s death was not inextricably intertwined with
Adams’ murder. 50 Given the entirely unrelated motives for each
murder (health club quarrels versus jealousy regarding a female’s
affections, respectively) and the length of time between the murders
(eight weeks), the court found it “impossible to perceive any legal
connection between the two cases.” 51 Although the methods were
similar in each murder, “the methods referred to are as identical as any
two shootings, stabbings, or assaults, but no more so.” 52 Without a
common plan or any similarities in motive or intent, the admission of
the evidence of Barnet’s murder was a “clear error of law” and
necessitated reversal of Molineux’s conviction. 53
2. Modern Application of the Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine in
the Seventh Circuit
The current state of the inextricable intertwinement doctrine is a
far cry from the original form pronounced in Molineux, which
encompassed only “circumstances which render[ed] it impossible to
prove one without proving all.” 54 The Seventh Circuit now considers
other crimes evidence to be inextricably intertwined with the charged
conduct when: (1) the evidence is so blended or connected that it
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends
to prove any element of the charged crime, (2) the absence of the
evidence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the story
of the charged crime, or (3) the evidence completes the story of the

49

Id.
Id. at 301.
51
Id. at 293.
52
Id. at 301.
53
Id. at 311.
54
Id. at 299.
50
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charged crime. 55 With the courts’ expansion of the doctrine, it has
morphed from one of practical necessity—essential to convicting
individuals of their charged crimes—to one of convenience.
This transformation has not gone unnoticed. Critics have widely
criticized the doctrine as well as the courts’ inconsistent and overly
broad application of it. 56 The courts are not entirely to blame,
however; the doctrine itself offers little by way of guidance.
“Inextricably intertwined,” “intricately related,” “blended,” and
“connected,” for example, are all nebulous terms, having only
relational meaning. “[T]he test creates confusion because, quite
simply, no one knows what it means.” 57 It is the “vacuous nature of
the test’s wording” 58 that gives rise to the doctrine’s criticism, as this
is precisely what makes the doctrine dangerous. The doctrine’s lack of
clarity is “a virtual invitation for abuse.” 59 Even with the best
intentions, it may be impossible for a court to accurately and
consistently apply the doctrine. However, courts are often condemned
as having less than the best intentions, “substitut[ing] a careful
analysis with [the doctrine’s] boilerplate jargon.” 60 Rather than
actually analyzing the necessity of the evidence, courts simply label

55

See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995).
“Every circuit now applies some formulation of the inextricably intertwined ‘test.’”
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
56
See generally Brauser, supra note 23; Milton Hirsch, “This New-Born Babe
an Infant Hercules”: The Doctrine of “Inextricably Intertwined” Evidence in
Florida's Drug Wars, 25 NOVA L. REV. 279 (2000); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Second Coming of Res Gestae: A Procedural Approach to Untangling the
“Inextricably Intertwined” Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s
Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 719 (2010).
57
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 363 (2010).
58
Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 729.
59
Id. at 730; see also Brauser, supra note 23, at 1610–11 (describing a case in
which the court found that other bad acts evidence set the “tone for the relationship”
between the defendant and an undercover agent although the tone of the relationship
was clearly not an element of the charged offenses).
60
Green, 617 F.3d at 246.
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the evidence as inextricably intertwined when in fact, the evidence
was “anything but inseparable.” 61
a. Evidence “so blended or connected that it incidentally involves,
explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends to prove any element
of the charged crime”
Uncharged criminal activity arising from the same transaction or
transactions as the crime charged is said to incidentally involve the
charged crime and as such, is admitted as inextricably intertwined
evidence. 62 In United States v. Gibson, 63 the defendant was charged
with four counts of distributing and possessing crack cocaine with the
intent to distribute. 64 During one of the charged sales, the defendant
agreed to sell two handguns to an undercover agent. 65 Evidence of the
potential gun sales was admitted at trial as inextricably intertwined,
and the defendant appealed on that basis. 66 The Seventh Circuit upheld
the admission, finding that because the defendant and the undercover
agent “were negotiating the sale of crack cocaine and guns at the same
time in the same conversations,” the evidence was inextricably
intertwined. 67
The Seventh Circuit also considers evidence that explains the
circumstances surrounding the charged crime to be inextricably
61

Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 730.
United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Uncharged
criminal activity is admissible under the ‘intricately related’ doctrine if it arises from
the same transaction or transactions as the charged crimes.”).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 676.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 680.
67
Id. at 681–82; see also United States v. Parkin, 917 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding evidence of conversation about potential cocaine sale that occurred
during charged marijuana sale inextricably intertwined); United States v. Hawkins,
823 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding evidence that defendant offered to
exchange guns for cocaine during charged gun transaction was inextricably
intertwined because statements were made during same transaction), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363 (7th Cir.1995).
62
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intertwined. For example, in United States v. Strong, 68 the defendant
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and in
possession of ammunition. 69 During his trial, the district court
admitted evidence that drugs were sold at the defendant’s home partly
because it “helped explain why he would possess [the firearm and
ammunition].” 70 The Seventh Circuit upheld the admission, explaining
that evidence of “drug trafficking supplies a motive for having [a] gun
. . . [b]ecause weapons are ‘tools of the trade’ of drug dealers.” 71 The
court found that evidence of the defendant’s involvement in drug
trafficking explained the circumstances surrounding his possession of
the firearm and ammunition. 72 In United States v. Richmond, 73 the
defendant was charged with, among other things, conspiracy for
making false statements to obtain a firearm. 74 The Seventh Circuit
again held that evidence of the defendant’s gang association was
inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracy, as the evidence
explained the circumstances surrounding the relationships of the
involved individuals. 75
Furthermore, evidence directly probative of the charged crime is
admissible in the Seventh Circuit under the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine, as it tends to prove an element of the charged
crime. For example, in United States v. Roberts, 76 the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, armed bank
robbery, use of a firearm in commission of a federal felony, and
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. 77
Evidence that the defendant was “caught with a dark steel revolver
with a brown handle matching the description of the weapon he used
only two days earlier to rob [a] Joliet bank [was] directly relevant to
68

485 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 986.
70
Id. at 990.
71
Id. (quoting United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000)).
72
Id.
73
222 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000).
74
Id. at 415.
75
Id. at 416–17.
76
933 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1991).
77
Id. at 517.
69
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the crimes with which he was charged.” 78 As such, the court
considered the evidence to be inextricably intertwined.79 Similarly, in
United States v. Muhammad, 80 the defendant appealed his conviction
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
possession of ammunition by a felon. 81 Police initially encountered the
defendant after being called to the scene of a shooting. 82 After the
defendant fled the scene, the police obtained a search warrant for his
home, where they found several boxes of ammunition. 83 The
defendant challenged admission of testimony regarding the shooting
scene as well as the admission of ammunition. 84 Testimony about the
defendant’s presence and flight from the shooting scene was admitted
to put his arrest “in context” and formed “at least in part the basis for
the indictment on [a charge of which he was acquitted] and for the
ammunition possession count.” 85 As such, “the testimony was
‘directly relevant to the crimes charged.’” 86 Evidence that the
defendant possessed the ammunition for which he was charged with
possessing “was direct evidence of the crime for which [he] was
indicted.” 87 The court considered this evidence to be inextricably
intertwined and upheld its admission as such. 88
Although in some situations, the evidence may in fact be
inextricably intertwined, the cases discussed above demonstrate the
court’s cavalier attitude to actually making that determination. For
example, in United States v. Gibson, 89 evidence that the defendant
attempted to negotiate the sale of firearms was found to be
inextricably intertwined with the four charged counts of distributing
78

Id. at 520.
Id.
80
928 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1991).
81
Id. at 1463.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1468.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
170 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1999).
79
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and possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine base. 90 The
attempted sale of the firearms was not an element of the charged
crime; 91 nor would the jury have been confused by the witness’s
testimony had evidence of the conversation remained unoffered.
Admittedly, evidence of any conversation relating to drugs may have
been relevant; however, evidence of an entirely separate topic
discussed by happenstance during the charged transactions is as
inextricably intertwined with the charged crime as any conversations
about the weather that may have taken place during that transaction. 92
Even a cursory analysis would have revealed that the evidence of the
defendant’s attempted firearm sale could easily have been extricated
without harm to the prosecution’s case. Furthermore, it is not
necessary to prove the circumstances surrounding a charged crime in
order to prove the charged crime itself. By deeming evidence of
extraneous circumstances “inextricable,” the Seventh Circuit has
misinterpreted what “inextricable” actually means.
b. Evidence whose “absence would create a chronological or
conceptual void in the story of the crime”
Evidence necessary to avoid a chronological or conceptual void in
the story of the crime is also frequently admitted as inextricably
intertwined evidence. For example, in United States v. Adamo, 93 the
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 94 He
challenged his conviction based partly on the district court’s decision
to admit evidence of his personal cocaine use.95 During his trial, the
prosecution offered testimony that he had purchased and consumed a
“sample” of cocaine on the date that the alleged conspiracy began. 96
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that
90

Id. at 676.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
92
See Gibson, 170 F.3d at 676.
93
882 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1989).
94
Id. at 1220
95
Id. at 1234.
96
Id.
91
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without the evidence, there would have been a “‘chronological and
conceptual void’ in the witness[es’] testimony” as they recounted the
events of that day. 97 Similarly, in United States v. Hattaway, 98
evidence of the victim’s boyfriend’s death was admitted in the
defendants’ trial for the abduction and holding of the victim. 99
Evidence of the circumstances of the death implicated the defendant
and the victim’s boyfriend in other crimes; this evidence helped the
jury understand, for example, why the victim failed to call the
authorities, which if absent would have left a chronological and
conceptual void in the account of her ordeal.100 However, as is evident
from discussions of these cases, evidence is now deemed to be
inextricably intertwined when there is any type of chronological or
conceptual void. Admission is no longer reserved for circumstances
without which there would be a nonsensical void; rather, admission is
now the regular course of action if there is any resulting chronological
or conceptual void.
Evidence of a defendant’s role in previous bad acts that constitute
necessary preliminary steps in completing the crime charged is also
considered inextricably intertwined; without such evidence, there
would be a chronological or conceptual void that may confuse the jury.
In United States v. Cox, 101 the court admitted evidence that the
defendant had committed credit card fraud as inextricably intertwined
with the charged crimes of persuading an individual to cross state lines
with the intent to engage in prostitution and with transporting
individuals under the age of 18 across state lines to engage in
prostitution. 102 The court found that evidence of credit card fraud
established that the defendant had sufficient resources to be a “pimp”
and proved how he “had the means to pay for the hotel gatherings at
which he promoted his prostitution business.” 103 The court reasoned
97

Id.
740 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1984).
99
Id. at 1424–25.
100
Id. at 1425.
101
577 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009).
102
Id. at 834.
103
Id. at 839.
98
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that without an understanding of the defendant’s involvement in that
preliminary step, there would have been a chronological and
conceptual void in the story of the charged crime. 104
c. Evidence that “completes the story of the crime charged”
Most other bad acts evidence can be said to complete the story of
the charged crime; as such, the court often considers this category to
overlap with the other categorical bases of admissibility. 105 For
example, in Gibson, 106 the court explicitly found that “there were at
least two bases for admitting the gun evidence.” 107 In addition to
viewing the evidence as so blended or connected to be inextricably
intertwined, 108 the gun evidence “was [also] necessary to provide the
jury with the ‘complete story’” of the defendant’s crimes; negotiations
about the gun were so intertwined with the drug sales “that admission
of the portions of the taped conversations pertaining to gun sales was
necessary to enable the jury to fully understand and make sense of the
underlying negotiations for the sale of crack cocaine.” 109
Similarly, in Hattaway, 110 in addition to considering evidence of
the victim’s boyfriend’s death necessary to avoid a chronological or
conceptual void, 111 the evidence also helped complete the story of the
victim’s ordeal. The evidence of the defendants’ role in her boyfriend’s
death explained why the defendants kidnapped her only to release her

104

Id.
This trend is unsurprising given the court’s changing formulations of the
inextricable intertwinement doctrine; the court now considers the “complete the
story” basis of intertwinement to be the same as the “chronological or conceptual
void” basis, contrary to earlier formulations. Compare, e.g., United States v. Luster,
480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2007), with United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096,
1102 (7th Cir. 1995).
106
United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1999).
107
Id. at 681.
108
See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
109
Gibson, 170 F.3d at 682.
110
United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1424–25 (7th Cir. 1984).
111
See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text.
105
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after her boyfriend’s body was found. 112 However, the court frequently
upholds the admission of other bad acts evidence, citing only the
“completes the story” basis of intertwinement. For example, in United
States v. Harris, 113 the Seventh Circuit considered testimony regarding
the defendant’s “modus operandi for the sale of drugs . . . including the
negotiations, the purchase, the transfer of the cocaine, and the use of
code language” as necessary to complete the story of the charged
crime of distributing cocaine. 114 Without this evidence, the jury would
have had “a somewhat confusing and incomplete picture.” 115
However, “all relevant prosecution evidence explains the crime or
completes the story.” 116 Therefore, the court must engage in careful
consideration of the evidence’s actual inextricableness lest it admit
dangerous evidence unnecessarily.
II. THE UNRAVELING OF THE INEXTRICABLE INTERTWINEMENT
DOCTRINE
Often, however, the Seventh Circuit is not specific as to why it
considers evidence inextricably intertwined. Even in the circumstances
in which the court is explicit, there is still significant overlap between
the categories, demonstrating, in part, the loose nature of the doctrine.
This looseness, as well as courts’ seeming difficulty in applying the
doctrine, has caused widespread criticism. Like many other
jurisdictions attempting to apply the inextricable intertwinement
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit seems to have “lost its way.”117

112

Hattaway, 740 F.2d at 1424–25.
271 F.3d 690, 705 (7th Cir. 2001).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
117
1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5, at 709
n.22 (6th ed. 2006).
113
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A. The Seventh Circuit’s Growing Dissatisfaction
Criticisms of the doctrine have not gone unnoticed, however, at
least by the Seventh Circuit. The court has become increasingly vocal
in expressing its own concerns regarding the doctrine and serious
doubts about the doctrine’s continuing viability. The court had
occasion to consider two instances of other crimes evidence admitted
under the inextricably intertwined doctrine in United States v.
Taylor. 118 Taylor and Hogsett were convicted in separate trials of
distributing crack. 119 Both appealed their convictions based on the
lower courts’ admission of other crimes evidence under the
inextricable intertwinement doctrine, and the Seventh Circuit
consolidated their appeals. 120 During Taylor’s trial, the prosecution
presented evidence that Taylor was a known crack dealer, with the
arresting officer, among others, testifying. 121 The officer testified that
he knew Taylor to be a crack dealer based on knowledge gained
“throughout his career as a police officer and as a drug and gang
officer.” 122 This testimony implied to the jury that Taylor had a long
history of drug and gang activity and thus was the basis of Taylor’s
appeal. 123 The prosecution argued that the testimony was inextricably
intertwined with the rest of the officer’s testimony; the statement
explained why the officer arrested Taylor for the admittedly trivial
offense of illegally tinted automobile windows: he knew Taylor’s car
and knew him to be a crack dealer. 124 However, the “evidence was at
once irrelevant and damaging, as was the officer’s testimony about his
prior professional knowledge of Taylor. It is not as if the government
118

522 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Taylor v. United States, 129
S. Ct. 190 (2008), and cert. denied, Hogsett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009).
119
Id. at 732.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 733.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 733–34.
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had to try to justify the arrest on the basis not of the traffic offenses but
of suspicion that Taylor was a drug dealer.” 125
Hogsett’s appeal was based on the trial testimony of the passenger
in his car at the time of his arrest. 126 She testified that she and Hogsett
were on their way “to hit a lick” when he was arrested and explained
that this meant that they were going to sell drugs. 127 When questioned
as to how she knew what “hit a lick” meant, she indicated that she had
hit licks with Hogsett in the past. 128 This last statement indicated that
the defendant had a history selling drugs, which was why the defense
objected to its admission. 129 The government argued that this
statement was inextricably intertwined with the rest of her testimony,
filling a conceptual void and forming “an integral part of the witness’
account of the circumstances surrounding the offenses of which the
defendant was indicted.” 130
In determining the propriety of admitting the statements into
evidence, the court expressed two interpretations of the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine: “evidence ‘intrinsic’ to the charged crime
itself, in the sense of being evidence of the crime” or “evidence of
another crime [that] may be introduced in order to ‘complete the story’
of the charged crime.” 131 However, “neither formulation is
satisfactory: to courts adopting the former, ‘inextricably intertwined
evidence is intrinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if it is inextricably
intertwined,’ while ‘the ‘complete the story’ definition of ‘inextricably
intertwined’ threatens to override Rule 404(b).” 132 The court found in
these two instances that the statements constituted impermissible
character evidence, implying to the jury that the defendants were
longtime drug offenders and suggesting that they were therefore more
likely to have committed the charged drug offenses. 133 The police
125

Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 734.
132
Id. (citing United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
133
Taylor, 522 F.3d at 735–36.
126

213
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/7

18

Padgett: How Less Is More: The Unraveling of the Inextricable Intertwineme

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

officer’s testimony was “just a way of telling the jury that the officer
knew Taylor to have been a drug offender and gang member for a long
time and that at the time of the arrest Taylor was a wanted
criminal.” 134 The same rationale applied to Hogsett’s case. 135 The
court recognized that the inextricable intertwinement doctrine’s
“vagueness invites prosecutors to expand the exceptions to the rule
beyond the proper boundaries of the exceptions.” 136 “A defendant’s
bad act may be only tangentially related to the charged crime, but it
nevertheless could ‘complete the story’ or ‘incidentally involve’ the
charged offense or ‘explain the circumstances.’ If the prosecution’s
evidence did not ‘explain’ or ‘incidentally involve’ the charged crime,
it is difficult to see how it could pass the minimal requirement for
admissibility that evidence be relevant.” 137
This potential for abuse motivated the court to carefully consider
whether the evidence could be admissible under any of Rule 404(b)’s
exceptions. “Almost all evidence admissible under the ‘inextricably
interwoven’ doctrine is admissible under one of the specific exceptions
in Rule 404(b).” 138 In actively re-directing the evidence to Rule
404(b), the court seemed to be attempting to redirect judges and
lawyers to the Rule’s exceptions as the primary basis to admit other
bad acts evidence. The court essentially re-offered the evidence it
deemed inadmissible under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine
under Rule 404(b). For example, the court argued that the officer’s
testimony in Taylor’s case could have been offered to demonstrate
identity: “the fact that a defendant’s buyers had dealt with him
previously could explain how they were able to identify him, why they
picked him for the controlled buy, and why he was willing to deal with
them.” 139 Similarly, the court argued that the passenger’s testimony in
Hogsett’s case could have been offered to show the absence of

134

Id. at 735.
Id. at 734–35.
136
Id. at 735.
137
Id. at 734.
138
Id. at 735.
139
Id. at 734.
135
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mistake. 140 The court pointed out that without the explanation of how
the passenger knew the meaning of “hit a lick,” the defense could have
challenged the accuracy of her understanding for lack of foundation in
its closing argument, leaving the prosecution no opportunity to present
contrary evidence. 141 Therefore, the prosecution could have offered
the testimony as a way of demonstrating absence of mistake. 142
Although the court determined that the evidence was improperly
admitted under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, given the
overwhelming evidence of guilt at the trials, the errors were deemed
harmless. 143 Given the harmless nature of the errors, the court did not
address the impact of the proper alternative bases of admissibility
under Rule 404(b); however, its distaste for the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine and strong preference for admission under
Rule 404(b) was clear.
The court’s strong preference for the use of Rule 404(b) as the
basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence is also evident in
United States v. Conner. 144 An FBI informant participated in two
controlled purchases of crack cocaine. 145 During the first buy on
December 20, 2006, the informant called Conner’s co-defendant,
Hughes, to request a quarter ounce of crack cocaine. 146 Hughes
indicated that although he did not have that amount, he knew someone
who did: Conner. 147 Hughes instructed the informant to meet him at
Conner’s residence, and there, Conner provided the informant with
5.737 grams of crack cocaine. 148 For the second buy on January 10,
2007, the informant called Conner directly to request the drugs. 149
However, when Conner did not return the informant’s call to provide
details of the sale, the informant resorted to contacting Hughes
140

Id. at 735.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 734–35.
144
583 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2009).
145
Id. at 1016.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
141
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again. 150 Hughes was able to make contact with Conner, who directed
him to another co-defendant, Robison. 151 Robison was in possession
of some of Conner’s crack cocaine supply, from which Conner
instructed him to provide the requisite amount to Hughes. 152 Robison
met the informant and Hughes at a local drug store and made the
exchange. 153 Conner was not present at this exchange. 154 Conner was
charged only for his involvement with the December 20, 2006, buy. 155
During Conner’s trial, the government introduced evidence of
Conner’s involvement with the January 10 buy, as well as evidence of
his prior drug-dealing relationships with his co-defendants, Hughes
and Robison. 156 Both Hughes and Robison pled guilty and agreed to
cooperate with the government, with both testifying against Conner. 157
Hughes testified to his and Conner’s long history of selling drugs
together and to the specifics of how Conner would prepare the crack
cocaine as well as how much money Conner would typically make
from these drug sales. 158 Robison testified to his involvement in
Conner’s operation, serving as a middleman making pickups and
deliveries of cocaine. 159 The government argued that this evidence was
inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged crime; it helped
provide the jury with a more complete picture, illustrating and
providing context for the relationship among the co-defendants as well
as indicating that the sale was not an isolated event. 160 The
government alternatively argued that the evidence was admissible
under Rule 404(b), as it demonstrated knowledge, intent, and a
common scheme or plan. 161 The district court did not address the
150

Id.
Id.
152
Id. at 1016–17.
153
Id. at 1017.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1020.
161
Id. at 1017.
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evidence’s admissibility under Rule 404(b) and opted instead to admit
the evidence under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine. 162
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was
inadmissible under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine. 163 As
Conner was charged only with distribution, the jury did not need to
understand the relationship among the co-defendants or the
circumstances surrounding the January 10 buy. 164 Neither evidence of
Conner’s relationship with his co-defendants nor his involvement in
the January 10 sale was “necessary to complete the story of the single
[distribution] on trial. Nor was it needed to avoid a conceptual or
chronological void in the story of the [charged distribution].” 165
Therefore, admission under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine
was inappropriate. 166 The court again emphasized the potential for
abuse of the doctrine and its strong preference for the use of Rule
404(b). 167
However, the court acknowledged that the doctrines, at least in
theory, have distinct purposes. 168 Evidence rightfully admitted under
the inextricable intertwinement doctrine does not fall within the
meaning of ‘other acts’ contemplated by Rule 404(b). 169 “[E]vidence
concerning the chronological unfolding of events that led to an
indictment, or other circumstances surrounding the crime, is not
evidence of ‘other acts’ within the meaning of [Rule] 404(b).” 170 As
the evidence in Conner’s case related to “separate transactions that
took place at separate times . . . [this evidence] . . . falls squarely
within the types of ‘other acts’ contemplated by Rule 404(b).” 171 After
a brief explanation of Rule 404(b)’s exceptions, the court found that
162

Id.
Id. at 1020.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1020–21 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 501 (7th
Cir. 2007)).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 1020.
168
Id. at 1021.
169
Id.
170
Id. (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995)).
171
Id.
163
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evidence of Conner’s prior drug relationship with his co-defendants
and his involvement with the January 10 sale were relevant to prove
absence of mistake, knowledge, and intent. 172
In so holding, the Conner court seemed to be reconsidering the
position developed in Taylor. By recognizing the distinct purposes that
the doctrines are meant to serve and attempting to classify the
evidence accordingly, the court indicated that there are situations in
which inextricably intertwined evidence will not be admissible under
Rule 404(b). While the Taylor court recognized this possibility, 173 its
focus was on the overlap between the two doctrines as bases of
admissibility rather than the differences. 174 The Conner court seemed
to be offering the inextricable intertwinement doctrine another chance
at life, provided that attorneys arguing for evidence’s admissibility
under the doctrine and lower court judges realize the potential dangers
of recklessly invoking the doctrine and follow the Seventh Circuit’s
guidance to begin using the doctrine in a safe and responsible
manner. 175
B. The End of the Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine in the Seventh
Circuit
However, in July 2010, the Seventh Circuit put the final nail in the
doctrine’s proverbial coffin. 176 The court explicitly abolished this
theory of admissibility for other bad acts evidence in United States v.
Gorman, 177 overturning a long history of allowing evidence to be
admitted under this doctrine.
The Gorman case came before the court on appeal from the
Southern District of Indiana. 178 Defendant Jamarkus Gorman had been
172

Id. at 1021–22.
See United States v. Taylor 522 F.3d 731, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2008).
174
Id. at 735 (“Almost all evidence admissible under the ‘inextricably
interwoven’ doctrine is admissible under one of the specific exceptions in Rule
404(b), or under the judge-made ‘no confusion’ exception . . . .”).
175
Conner, 583 F.3d at 1024–25.
176
See United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 711–12.
173
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convicted of perjury after giving false testimony before a grand jury in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 179 In the course of investigating
Gorman’s cousin for drug trafficking, federal agents obtained and
executed a search warrant for Gorman’s home, intending to seize a
Bentley automobile they believed had been obtained by the proceeds
of the cousin’s illegal drug trafficking activities. 180 The agents
informed Gorman of their intentions, whereupon he indicated that he
was unaware of any such Bentley. 181 Gorman escorted the agents to
the building’s garage and indicated parking spots 20 and 22 as his
assigned parking spots. 182 These parking spots were vacant, and the
agents’ investigation concluded without recovery of the Bentley. 183
Despite his assignment to these parking spots, Gorman actually
used parking spots 31A and B, in which the Bentley was parked. 184
These parking spaces, and thus the Bentley, were not visible from the
parking spots that Gorman showed the agents. 185 Following the
agents’ departure, Gorman enlisted several unscrupulous individuals to
assist him in removing the Bentley from the building’s parking garage
altogether. 186 Upon Gorman’s instruction and direction, these
individuals removed the Bentley by greasing the floor with oil to allow
the Bentley’s tires to slide and loading the automobile into the bed of a
flatbed tow truck. 187 At the automobile shop to which the individuals
had towed the Bentley, the men broke into the car by cutting the soft
top and by prying open the trunk to remove bags of money. 188 The car
was subsequently abandoned and found shortly thereafter by the
investigating agents. 189

179

Id. at 713; see 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006).
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 713.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 713–14.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 714.
185
Id. at 713–14.
186
Id. at 714.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
180
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It was during the investigation of yet another alleged illegal
activity perpetrated by his cousin that Gorman was called to testify
before the grand jury. 190 He was questioned about the Bentley, and it
was his remarks on this subject that gave rise to the perjury case
against him. 191 The testimony was as follows:
Grand Juror: Mr. Gorman, did you have a Bentley in your
garage at Lion’s Gate [his residence searched by the federal
agents]?
Jamarkus: No.
Grand Juror: Ever?
Jamarkus: No, never. 192
Prior to the trial, the government notified Gorman of its intention
to introduce evidence of his involvement in an uncharged conspiracy
to obstruct justice by concealing evidence from federal officers in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) 193 —namely, evidence of Gorman’s
involvement with the storage and subsequent theft of the Bentley. 194
Objecting to the use of such evidence, the defense filed a motion in
limine seeking to suppress the evidence as impermissible other bad
acts evidence under 404(b). 195 The defense argued that the evidence
tended to prove only Gorman’s propensity to commit perjury by
subjecting him to the risk that the jury would “assume that anyone
who would commit such a theft would have a propensity to commit
the somewhat less extravagant perjury that was charged.” 196 The
190

Id. at 714–15.
Id. at 715.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Brief and Required Combined Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Jamarkus
Gorman at 8, United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3010).
191
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government argued for the admissibility of the evidence, claiming that
the evidence of the storage and theft “provide[d] an explanation of
why [Gorman] would make the charged false declaration,” filling
“what would otherwise be a gaping conceptual void.” 197 The district
court admitted this evidence under the inextricable intertwinement
doctrine, finding that the evidence was “inextricably intertwined to
[sic] the fact of the perjury . . . and provides an explanation to the jury
to understand why the defendant would . . . provide the false
statement.” 198 The district court thus included the evidence of
Gorman’s involvement with the Bentley as evidence of his motivation
to commit perjury. 199 The jury convicted Gorman of perjury and
sentenced him to thirty-six months of imprisonment. 200
Gorman appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based on, inter alia, the admission of
the evidence relating to his involvement in the storage and theft of the
Bentley. 201 A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. 202 The appellate court gives special
deference to the trial court’s rulings and should reverse only where the
record contains no evidence on which the district court judge could
have rationally based his or her evidentiary ruling. 203 In determining
whether the district court improperly admitted the evidence, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the three general bases of admissibility of
197

Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America at 33, United States
v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3010).
198
Brief and Required Combined Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Jamarkus
Gorman, supra note 196, at 18.
199
The district court found that “to include the facts as alleged that it had to do
with retrieving or claiming the money that was stashed in the automobile, and that it
was allegedly drug proceeds, are also relevant facts, and the prejudicial value of
which does not outweigh the probative value in this case because they are
inextricably intertwined to [sic] the fact of the perjury, and that is alleged in the
indictment, and provides an explanation to the jury to understand why the defendant
would, if the Government can prove that he did, provide the false statement . . . .”
Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America, supra note 197, at 16.
200
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 715.
201
Id.
202
United States v. Joseph, 310 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2002).
203
United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 472 (7th Cir. 2002).
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other bad acts evidence: (1) direct evidence, (2) Rule 404(b)’s “other
bad acts” evidence, and (3) inextricably intertwined or intricately
related evidence. 204 Evidence of Gorman’s involvement in the
uncharged conspiracy was admitted as inextricably intertwined
evidence; 205 accordingly, the court should review the evidence in light
of that doctrine. However, the court did not address whether the
evidence was properly admitted as inextricably intertwined
evidence. 206 The standard of review is such that if the record reflects
any rational basis for the district court’s admission of the evidence, the
district court’s finding will be affirmed. 207 “Under an abuse of
discretion standard of review, as long as the admission was proper, the
fact that the rationale for admission may have been blurred matters
little.” 208 The court indicated that, “any confusion of the proper
channel of admissibility is insignificant to that ultimate outcome.” 209
Given that Gorman was charged with perjury based on his denial of
ever having the Bentley, the court believed that the evidence that he
actually did have the Bentley was direct evidence of the charged
crime. 210 Therefore, the evidence would have been properly admitted
as direct evidence; the fact that it was admitted as inextricable
intertwinement evidence “is insignificant to th[e] ultimate
outcome.” 211
Although the court did not address whether the evidence of
Gorman’s involvement in the uncharged conspiracy was inextricably
intertwined with the charged perjury, the court did address the
inextricable intertwinement doctrine in great detail. Having “recently
cast doubt on the continuing viability of the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine,” 212 the court now moved to completely
204

Gorman, 613 F.3d at 717–18.
Id. at 715.
206
Id. at 717–20.
207
Id. at 717, 719.
208
Id. at 719 (citing Conley, 291 F.3d at 472).
209
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 718; see also United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Taylor 522 F.3d 731, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2008).
205
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abolish the doctrine, believing it to have “outlived its usefulness.” 213
Having earlier surveyed the three bases of admissibility of other bad
acts evidence, the court discussed the relationship among the three
doctrines and concluded that there is no further need for the
inextricably intertwined doctrine. 214 Either other bad acts evidence is
direct evidence, in which case it is always admissible, constrained only
by Rule 403, or it is propensity evidence, in which case it is
constrained by Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. 215 The court found that
“almost all evidence admitted under this [inextricable intertwinement]
doctrine is also admissible under Rule 404(b).”216 For example, in this
case, had the evidence not been direct evidence, it would have been
admissible under Rule 404(b) as indicative of motive. As such, “there
is often no need to spread the fog of inextricably intertwined over
it.” 217 The court found that the inextricable intertwinement doctrine
has become “overused, vague, and quite unhelpful.” 218 Given the
doctrine’s confusing nature and the court’s belief in its redundancy in
light of other doctrines, the court concluded that “[h]enceforth, resort
to inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when determining a
theory of admissibility.” 219
C. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit believed that “almost all evidence admitted
under [the inextricable intertwinement] doctrine is also admissible
under Rule 404(b).” 220 This means one of two things: (1) either the
court is merging the doctrine with Rule 404(b) and in effect, indicating
its position that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than one of
exclusion, or (2) the court is eradicating bases of admissibility
213

Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.
Id. at 718–19.
215
Id. at 718.
216
Id. (quoting Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019).
217
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 718 (quoting Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
218
Id. at 719.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 718 (citing Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019).
214
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previously covered by the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, such
as ‘explains the circumstances’ if there is not a corresponding
exception under Rule 404(b). Either way, the court has taken important
and necessary steps to safeguard defendants’ rights. 1. Rule 404(b) as
Inclusive or Exclusive
There has been substantial debate regarding whether Rule
404(b)’s list of exceptions was meant to be exhaustive, and thus
whether Rule 404(b) was meant to be an inclusive or exclusive rule.
Many courts view the Rule’s language of “such as” as indicative of
Congress’s intent that the list be non-exhaustive, i.e., that other bad
acts evidence be admissible for purposes other than those specifically
articulated by the Rule. 221 Based on this language, courts admit other
bad acts evidence for purposes not specifically articulated by Rule
404(b). 222
However, a careful examination of Rule 404(b)’s legislative
history indicates that this may not have been Congress’ intent, and by
imputing such an intent, the courts have created a plethora of
“overused, vague, and quite unhelpful” 223 overlapping doctrines of
admissibility. As originally submitted to Congress, Rule 404(b) read:

221

See United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–89) (“The aim of the rule is simply
to keep from the jury evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is
otherwise a bad person.”); Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[W]e
reject the appellant’s concept that Rule 404(b) contains a comprehensive list of all
the ways in which evidence of other bad acts may be specially relevant. Although the
text of that rule enumerates some of the purposes for which such evidence may be
admitted (e.g., to show ‘motive’ or ‘intent’), that list is not exhaustive.”); United
States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 196 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[Rule 404(b)’s] list is not
exhaustive . . . ‘for the range of relevancy outside the ban is almost infinite; and
further, . . . the purposes are not mutually exclusive for the particular line of proof
may fall within several of them.’”) (citing CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190
at 448 (Cleary ed. 1972)).
222
See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2003)
(admitting other bad acts evidence to refute defense’s assertions defendant was too
unsophisticated to have committed charged crime).
223
Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.
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Evidence of other bad acts, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. This subdivision does not exclude the
evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 224
The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary amended
the second sentence of the Rule to read “It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” 225 The House believed that this formulation of the Rule
placed greater emphasis on admissibility. 226 However, this does not
indicate that the House intended to change the scope of the Rule.
Placing greater emphasis on admissibility is not the same thing as
changing the scope of admissibility. Congress simply changed the
sentence from a negative statement to a positive one, which does not
necessarily reflect any substantive changes in the statement’s meaning.
Although there may not be any decisive evidence of Congress’
intended scope for Rule 404(b), in effect, the scope of the Rule could
be precisely what the Seventh Circuit decided in Gorman. 227 By redirecting all evidence previously understood as inextricably
intertwined to be admitted under Rule 404(b), the court may have
subtly indicated its position that Rule 404(b) is to be applied as a rule
of inclusion. 228 Admission under Rule 404(b) requires many safety
precautions for defendants not taken when the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine is invoked. By viewing the Rule as inclusive,
the court may be merging the inextricable intertwinement doctrine
with Rule 404(b); this allows the court to provide necessary protection
224

Fed. Rules of Evidence Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule, Notes to
Rule 404 (Jan. 2, 1975, P.L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1932; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Oct. 1,
1987) (Amended Dec. 1, 1991) (emphasis added).
225
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1974) (emphasis added).
226
Id.
227
See 613 F.3d 711.
228
See id. at 718–19.
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to defendants’ rights by subjecting the evidence to the Rule’s
precautions without the court having to worry that necessary
prosecutorial evidence will systemically go unadmitted as a result of
the inextricable intertwinement doctrine’s abolition.
2. Providing More Protection to Defendants
Prior to the court’s ruling in Gorman, by simply labeling evidence
as “inextricably intertwined,” courts could avoid examining the
evidence’s applicability of evidence under Rule 404(b). For example,
to admit other bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b), the Seventh
Circuit stated that the court must determine if:
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in
issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the
crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is
similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the
matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury
finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4)
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 229
In failing to examine the admissibility of evidence under Rule
404(b), courts turn a “blind eye to the danger of admitting prejudicial
[other bad acts] evidence.” 230 Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)
entails a variety of precautionary steps, such as requiring notice to the
defendant, requiring the non-propensity purpose to be specifically
articulated, and requiring a corresponding limiting instruction. 231 All
of these precautions are designed to protect the defendant from what is
known to be extremely prejudicial evidence. 232 Although evidence
admitted as inextricably intertwined is subject to Rule 403’s balancing
229

United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 1990).
Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 730; see also supra text accompanying
notes 13–18.
231
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
232
See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
230
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test, 233 the evidence is not subject to any other constraints. 234 This is
presumably because evidence historically admitted under this doctrine
was not offered to prove anything. Inextricably intertwined evidence
was not meant to be substantively considered; rather, the evidence was
simply necessary to maintain cohesion in the prosecution’s case. 235
Therefore, precautions ensuring that the evidence would be nonprejudicial did not develop. To use inextricably intertwined evidence,
the government does not have to prove that the defendant actually
committed the other bad acts; 236 in contrast, many jurisdictions require
the government to prove to some standard that the defendant actually
committed the other bad acts in question. 237 Furthermore, neither the
prosecution nor the judge must specify “why he or she believes that
the deletion of the references will impair the narrative integrity of the
prosecution’s account of the charged offense;” 238 for example,
although it may be argued that without the evidence, there will be a
chronological or conceptual void in the evidence, neither is required to
identify what that void may be. 239 Although some jurisdictions do
provide a limiting instruction for inextricably intertwined evidence,

233

FED. R. EVID. 403; see also, e.g., United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985,
990–91 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Even inextricably intertwined evidence must withstand
scrutiny under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a district court to
exclude relevant evidence if its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its
probative value.”).
234
See United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 763–64 (7th Cir. 2002). “[S]o
long as those [inextricably intertwined] acts meet the requirements of Rule 403, they
may be admitted in evidence at trial.” Id. at 764.
235
See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
236
See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b):
The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947,
961, 971–72. “As the courts began to articulate preadmission requirements for Rule
404(b) evidence, particularly the clear and convincing standard of proof prior to
admission, the courts were reluctant to subject [inextricably intertwined] evidence to
these requirements, because to do so would put too great a burden upon the
government.” Id. at 971.
237
See generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
238
Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 731.
239
Id. at 741.
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guiding the jury away from impermissible character inferences, 240
there is a “marked judicial trend” towards not providing such an
instruction. 241 Furthermore, whereas evidence admitted under Rule
404(b) may be used only to demonstrate the element for which it was
offered, 242 “treating evidence as inextricably intertwined . . . also
carries the implicit finding that the evidence is admissible for all
purposes notwithstanding its bearing on character, thus eliminating the
defense’s entitlement, upon request, to a jury instruction.” 243
CONCLUSION
By abolishing the doctrine of inextricable intertwinement as a
basis for other bad acts evidence in Gorman, 244 the Seventh Circuit
not only afforded desperately needed protections to defendants but
also eased a substantial burden on the judicial system. As previously
applied, the doctrine threatened defendants’ rights to a fair trial, too
easily allowing impermissible character evidence to be admitted
because it was inextricably intertwined with evidence necessary to
prove the charged crime. 245 Therefore, if the court had continued to
use this doctrine, to adequately protect defendants, it would have been
necessary to overhaul the doctrine, clearly delineating what evidence
is and is not admissible under it, as this is currently unclear. 246 This
task has plagued courts for more than 100 years; 247 however, even if
the court found its way through the fog, continuing to use the doctrine
would require detailed analyses of the facts of each case and a detailed
construction and evaluation of each parties’ arguments to determine
exactly what evidence is inextricably intertwined. Not only would this
further stress an already extremely over-worked judiciary, but it also
240

Id. at 731.
Id. at 742.
242
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
243
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
244
613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010).
245
See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
246
Id.
247
See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).
241
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interferes with the parties’ rights to construct their case as they so
choose and potentially affects the court’s impartiality. This area of the
law is contentious enough, with Rule 404(b) being the most litigated
Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 248 Compounding the
complexities of this Rule by continuing to have a vague and misused
doctrine was wasteful of the judiciary’s already scarce time and
dangerous for defendants. By abolishing the doctrine of inextricable
intertwinement and having one less basis of admissibility for other bad
acts evidence, the court has given defendants and the judiciary in
general so much more.

248

MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 327 n.2. (noting that Rule 404(b) cases were
as abundant “as the sands of the sea”).
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